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ABSTRACT
This article will investigate current state laws regarding the
change of a husband’s name to his wife’s upon marriage. Given that
tradition, and often law itself, discourage that practice, the lingering
gendered norms that perpetuate the historical tradition will be ex-
plored. Components of this article will include a brief historical
analysis of the origin of surnames and the law as it has developed
on that issue, including an examination of the place of tradition in
the law both empirically and normatively. A discussion of the psycho-
logical importance of names in the identities of men versus women
will be addressed, as will possible justifications for the distinction
between the rights of men and women in this regard. Finally, this
article will discuss the application of gender discrimination laws
and constitutional equal protection doctrine to current laws that
provide differing rights and privileges based solely on one’s status as
a wife versus a husband.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose we had a tradition that when blacks mar-
ried whites, the white name was always the name
used by the family. It would be an outrage and
racist. . . . [T]his is one of the last vestiges of sexism.
—Morrison Bonpasse1
There is something sacred about a name. It is our
own business, not the government’s.
—Henne v. Wright2
When I was eight years old I discovered a piece of mail apparently
addressed to my father; it bore his first and last name, but was pre-
ceded by the word “Mrs.” Obviously, the sender had made a mistake.
Highly amused at the identification of my father as a married woman,
and pleased as any eight-year-old can be at my cleverness in catching
the mistake, I showed the mail to my mother, expecting her to laugh
with me and shake her head at the sloppiness. Instead, she told me
that there was no mistake. The mail was not for my father, but for
her. Addressing a woman by her husband’s name was “just the way
things were done.” There was no explanation whatsoever as to the
logic or fairness behind the practice other than a vague notion of tra-
dition, which failed to satisfy any conceptions I had of either logic or
fairness. The issue was dropped; I was completely bewildered.
From that point on I have been fascinated and confounded by
marital naming conventions that exist—and persist—over time. By
the time I married in 2005, I had long since decided that I would keep
my name. While my husband was supportive, the decision immedi-
ately raised eyebrows and created issues with others: for example, how
would the minister announce us at the end of the wedding ceremony?
Mr. and Mrs. Anthony wouldn’t work; neither would Mr. Gandara and
Ms. Anthony—we were already that before we married. No one knew
quite how to handle it. The minister thought she had the solution:
“We should just announce you both with his name,” she decided,
“since according to the law, you will automatically have it anyway.”
Of course she was wrong about that, but I was stunned not only that
someone in the business of marrying couples could be so misinformed,
but that apparently the issue had never previously been raised for
1. Morrison Bonpasse, quoted in Chris Poon, The Name Game—A Bride Has to Decide:
Should She Change, Stay the Same, Hyphenate, or Invent?, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 17,
1999, at 8L.
2. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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her. Thus, I experienced the first of many marital name problems—
the practices surrounding which often still exemplify antiquated tra-
ditions, practices, and even laws—in a society whose gender norms
are, in our own collective estimation, supposedly enlightened. My hus-
band had not yet considered taking my name, but he decided to do so
shortly thereafter. It was then that I discovered exactly how unequal
our cultural marriage norms can still be—and how those norms often
have legal backing.
It is quite clear that times are changing when it comes to mar-
riage, family, and gender roles. Women are marrying later, and more
often not at all, than they have in the past. When they do marry,
couples often desire flexibility in choosing their last names. Their
reasons may vary: a woman may have professional accomplishments
under a birth name; she (or they) may decide on principle that they
want a more gender-equal naming solution; she may have a desire
not to lose her identity; she may have a strong connection with a birth
name or have children with her current last name. Whatever the
reasons for opting for an unconventional naming solution, the fact
is that the law has trailed behind the times when it comes to allow-
ing for the flexibility necessary to effectuate these choices. While a
woman can simply adopt her husband’s surname upon marriage, a
man faces a much more challenging process if he wishes to take his
wife’s surname.3
The law—especially family law—serves the function of channeling
people into certain socially preferred institutions and practices, while
discouraging those that are viewed as less acceptable. As such, the law
reinforces and encourages behavior considered desirable by society—
or, perhaps, behavior once considered desirable but not subjected to
recent critical examination. For example, there exists a plethora of
benefits that accompany marriage which cannot be achieved any other
way, a fact which serves to encourage people to enter the institution.4
Extending those benefits to those outside of the institution is often
derided as lessening the importance or “sanctity” of marriage.5 In
3. See Steve Friess, More Men Taking Wives’ Last Names, USA TODAY, Mar. 21,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-20-names-marriage_N.htm (“Only
seven states now allow a man who wishes to alter his name after his wedding to do so
without going through the laborious, frequently expensive legal process set out by the
courts for any name change. Women don’t have to do so.”).
4. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT 3, (1997); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT 1 (2004); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for
Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2694 (2004).
5. JAMES C. DOBSON, MARRIAGE UNDER FIRE: WHY WE MUST WIN THIS BATTLE 4 
(2007).
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many states, for example, the courts refuse to recognize cohabitation
agreements among unmarried couples who choose to arrange their
relationships in certain ways. Such a recognition, the courts contend,
would make marriage less attractive6—as if that alone were reason
enough to reject a policy out of hand.
The current law regarding names and name changes upon mar-
riage belongs exclusively to the states.7 While one might assume that
gender discrimination has disappeared from our laws, if not from our
social structure, as of 2010 the majority of states do not allow a man
to change his name to that of his wife by virtue of marriage, while
the woman can do so via a simple and straightforward process in
every state except one.8 Although there has been very little scholar-
ship on this issue, what exists points to this fact as overt discrimina-
tion against men, and therefore unconstitutional. Yet there is much
more to the issue than mere discrimination against men. Underlying
the policy is discrimination against women, in the form of a legal sanc-
tion of the social norms that once legally subsumed women within
their husbands’ identities. Thus, the law discourages and penalizes
men for making a “sacrifice” normally required, or expected, of women.
Although naming practices and policy may not appear to be as sig-
nificant as many other critical equality issues including employment
discrimination, intimate partner violence, or reproductive rights,
they are a fundamental representation of the notion of choice—the
choice to structure one’s own identity, life, and family as one sees
fit.9 As such, the current state of the law reinforces unequal cultural
norms and archaic gender roles, represents and implicitly supports
inequality, and violates the constitutional principle of equal protec-
tion of the laws.
I. ORIGINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SURNAMES
Before investigating the current state of marital name change
law, it is helpful to understand the history and development of both
custom and law on surnames. American legal and social custom on
names was handed down from the common law of England. In sev-
eral thousand years of recorded history, surnames are a “relatively
6. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL—CONSULAR AFFAIRS, Vol. 7, 15-
19 (2009); Name of Applicant to be Used in Passport, 22 C.F.R. § 51.25 (2010).
8. Louisiana law provides that “[m]arriage does not change the name of either spouse.
However, a married person may use the surname of either or both spouses as a surname.”
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (2009).
9. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is to Call Things by Their Right
Names, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 3 (1997).
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recent phenomenon,”10 supplementing the use of first names, which
has always been universal.11 Any current-day notion that surnames
are permanent is a gross misconception;12 surnames themselves did
not exist in England before the Norman Conquest in 1066.13 The word
“surname” originates from “sir” name,14 or “sire” name,15 and was ini-
tially used only by aristocracy, knights and gentry.16 Their use gradu-
ally spread down the social ladder, until eventually even peasants
used them regularly.17
After the Norman invasion, old Saxon customs, including those
regarding names, were replaced with Norman ones.18 Populations in-
creased and larger cities grew while the list of possible first names
was quite limited, resulting in confusion and the increasing need for
some other means of identifying individuals.19 Surnames therefore be-
came more common in thirteenth and fourteenth-century England.20
Adding to the necessity of more precise names, the state began to
require a way to identify and regulate its citizens.21 Kelly argues that
early naming conventions also developed as a way to shape and struc-
ture citizens’ lives to correspond with the dominant culture,22 a pur-
pose which is still extant today. The use of surnames was quite flexible
and inconsistent until the 1500s, however.23 Names themselves were
chosen by the bearer, sometimes according to local laws.24 A 1465 law,
for example, dictated that every Irishman living within specified dis-
tricts should “take to him an English surname of one town, as Sutton,
Chester, Trynn, Skryne, Corke, Kinsall; or colour, as white, black,
brown; or arte or science, as smith or carpenter; or office as cooke,
butler.” 25 Names changed quickly and easily through the fourteenth
10. WILLIAM DODGSON BOWMAN, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 13 (1932); L. G. PINE, THE
STORY OF SURNAMES 11-12 (3d ed. 1970); Cynthia Blevins Doll, Harmonizing Filial and
Parental Rights in Names: Progress, Pitfalls, and Constitutional Problems, 35 HOW. L.J.
227, 228 (1992).
11. Doll, supra note 10, at 228.
12. PINE, supra note 10, at 19.
13. Id. at 10.
14. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 9.
15. DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 25 (1980).
16. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8, 9.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-
Centered Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
19. Id.; Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 366 (1998).
20. PINE, supra note 10, at 11; Kelly, supra note 18, at 10.
21. Kelly, supra note 18, at 6.
22. Id.
23. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
24. PINE, supra note 10, at 10; BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
25. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 8.
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century, and reflected a person’s trade, personal and physical charac-
teristics, or residence more often than their paternity.26 As a result
of this flexibility in name choice, members of the same family would
often have different surnames,27 and those names would frequently
change throughout one’s life.28 John Smith could have a daughter
named Maude Weaver and a son named Henry Short, who may also
be known as Henry Hill if he lived on a hill, or Henry Johnson as the
son of John. Surnames gradually began to be hereditary in the four-
teenth century due to state registration of citizens requiring more
naming consistency.29 As Kelly points out, many of the common
English names of today reflect important functions of fourteenth
century life.30 Yet surnames were not universal or firmly established
in all parts of England even by the early 1700s.31 Indeed, the British
royal family itself had no surname at all until 1917 when they
adopted the name Windsor,32 apparently as a means of distinguish-
ing the family from the Germans during World War I.33 Surnames,
therefore, developed out of a combination of “custom, convenience,
and law.” 34
The surnames of women in particular have not been well docu-
mented,35 which essentially writes females out of history as their
ancestry is so difficult to trace.36 Evidence suggests, however, that
girls were given names such as Alice Tomsdaughter, but these names
were largely lost in time because English custom developed such that
women tended to adopt the surnames of their husbands.37 Yet it is also
clear that there were exceptions to the norm; historically, if the wife
inherited property, then her husband and children would take her
last name in order to attach themselves to the estate.38 Tuttle argues
that the purpose of this was to ensure that the family and future gen-
erations might be “deluded” into believing in the consistency of the
male line.39 With time, however, the law imposed further restrictions
26. Doll, supra note 10, at 228.
27. Id. (citing Smith v. U.S. Casualty Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 (N.Y. 1910)).
28. PINE, supra note 10, at 15.
29. Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
30. Id. at 11-12.
31. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 10.
32. PINE, supra note 10, at 15.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Kelly, supra note 18, at 12.
35. Id. at 10.
36. SPENDER, supra note 15, at 24-25.
37. Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
38. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); see also PINE, supra note 10,
at 23; Kelly, supra note 18, at 11.
39. PINE, supra note 10, at 24.
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upon women’s ownership of property, so that eventually only males
were permitted ownership by law. This effectively ended the practice
of men taking their wives’ names at marriage.
Although westerners tend to think of our naming structure as
set in stone and as representing the only reasonable approach, not
only did these structures vary within our own culture over time, but
worldwide many other practices have abounded.40 There are still no
surnames at all in many non-western societies.41 “Matronymics,”or
the practice of naming after the maternal line, exists in modern Spain,
medieval England, and amongst medieval Arabs and Jews.42 Indeed,
in medieval England children were often given the names of their
mothers, or assumed them voluntarily, even when they were not ille-
gitimate.43 In some cultures, surnames are narrative and are neither
patrilineal nor matrilineal.44
Clearly, then, there is a wide range of experience and custom
with respect to surnames, not only worldwide, but in our own cultural
history as well. Surnames today reflect both how the family is struc-
tured, and how we believe it should be structured.45
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF SURNAMES
The common experience of mankind . . . points up
the universal importance to each individual of his
own very personal label.
—O’Brien v. Tilson46
Surnames give an individual a personal identity
and selfawareness.
—Roe v. Conn47
Is our name really a trivial matter, one to which we should pay
little heed? Experience and evidence indicate otherwise: our names
are at the cornerstone of our lives; they make a statement both indi-
vidually and collectively. They serve as the symbol of one’s individu-
ality, lineage, family beliefs, religion, and community, all of which
40. Kelly, supra note 18, at 7 (noting the wealth of possible naming systems worldwide).
41. See id. (discussing the lack of surnames in the matrilineal Himalayan Bhutanese
society in Thailand) (citing See Her Hands, MOTHER-JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 40).
42. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
43. BOWMAN, supra note 10, at 95.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Kelly, supra note 18, at 5-6.
46. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
47. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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are fundamental to identity.48 Names may also communicate certain
values, including those of equality.49 Indeed:
[F]or most of us, a name is much more than just a tag or a label.
It is a symbol which stands for the unique combination of char-
acters and attributes that define us as an individual. It is the
closest thing that we have to a shorthand for self-concept.50
In the context of surname choice at marriage, this may also reveal the
type of relationship a couple has or desires: independence, equality,
and a rejection of traditional gender roles may all be reflected by a
non-traditional last name choice.51 The use and regulation of names
is clearly anything but trivial.
Indeed, names often function as much more than a symbol of
one’s identity. They also constitute “linguistic correlates of social
structure,” 52 and have been used throughout history as a means of
oppression and control by stripping groups of their right to self-
determination and self-identification.53
One’s name also appears to have direct psychological effects on
others. Names are, in fact, “charged with hidden meanings and un-
spoken overtones that profoundly help or hinder you in your rela-
tionships and your life.” 54 One study found that married women who
retain their surnames are more likely to be viewed as independent,
assertive, well-educated, unattractive, feminist, and non-religious
than those who adopt their husband’s name.55 Women called “Ms.”
were thought to be less honest than those called “Miss” or “Mrs.” or
with no title at all.56 Indeed, Hillary Rodham Clinton exemplifies this
image problem. She retained her birth name when she married in
1975, going by Hillary Rodham alone.57 This fact caused significant
48. Michael Rosensaft, The Right of Men to Change Their Names Upon Marriage, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 186, 190 (2002); Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1-2.
49. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 10.
50. Leissner, supra note 19, at 329 (quoting ELSDON C. SMITH, THE STORY OF OUR
NAMES 277 (1950)).
51. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 10.
52. Id. at 2 (citing John Bregenzer, Naming Practices in South America, 35 J. MINN.
ACAD. SCI. 47 (1968)).
53. Leissner, supra note 19, at 330-31.
54. CHRISTOPHER P. ANDERSEN, THE NAME GAME 13 (1977).
55. Donna L. Atkinson, Names and Titles: Maiden Name Retention and the Use of
Ms., 10 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 37, 37 (1987); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name
Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 780
(2007) (describing the attorney general’s opinion that a woman who wants to retain her
maiden name is “odd” and “confused”).
56. Emens, supra note 55, at 780.
57. Michael Mahoney Frandina, A Man’s Right to Choose His Surname in Marriage:
A Proposal, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 155, 158 (2009).
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criticism of her husband during his Arkansas gubernatorial race: his
wife, it seemed, did not reflect important local values or present an
acceptable role model for Arkansas girls.58 He lost his re-election bid
in 1980.59 For the next race, Hillary dropped the name Rodham and
went by Hillary Clinton (and even Mrs. Bill Clinton).60 Her husband
then won the gubernatorial election in 1982.61 After Mr. Clinton
eventually became president, Hillary brought back Rodham, going
by Hillary Rodham Clinton.62 During her own campaign for president
in 2008, she dropped Rodham and was again Hillary Clinton.63 Other
common assumptions, which were often cited in court cases on the
issue, included the idea that couples with different last names must
be presumed unmarried, thereby stigmatizing children.64 A 2002 study
found that college students perceived men and women with hyphen-
ated names differently than those without them.65 Many viewed
women who kept their birth names as harboring less commitment
to the marriage,66 though the reality was found to conflict with that
assumption.67 Even the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service) considers it a red flag
impugning the validity of a marriage when the woman retains her
birth name.68
It is sometimes argued that the status quo with respect to marital
names is appropriate because men are more connected to their names
than are women. Certainly throughout most of modern history, society
has accorded the surnames of men much more importance.69 Names
have tended to be more transitory for women, and as a result, men
tend to hold more steadfastly to their names as a symbol of their
identity. The common conception is that only men have “real” names,
and their permanency is one of the rights of being male.70 As we will
see, that notion has made its way into the legal system, where the
58. Jennifer Christman, The Name Game Despite Options, 90% of Women Choose to
Take Husband’s Name, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2000, at F1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; Frandina, supra note 57, at 158-59 (citing Larissa Dubecki, So What’s in a
Name? Maybe a Presidency . . . , THE AGE, May 12, 2007, at 3).
64. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 19.
65. Gordon B. Forbes et al., Perceptions of Married Women and Married Men with
Hyphenated Surnames, 46 SEX ROLES 167, 172 (2002).
66. David R. Johnson & Laurie Scheuble, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes
of College Students, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 750 (1993).
67. Betsy Rubiner, Married Women and Surnames: Tradition Still Plays a Large
Role, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996.
68. Kelly, supra note 18, at 28.
69. Doll, supra note 10, at 229.
70. SPENDER, supra note 15, at 24.
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courts have time and time again upheld a man’s naming “rights” with
respect to his wife and children. Whereas the identities of women
change based on their relation to others, men’s identities are solid
and consistent.71 Because of the fleeting nature of a woman’s name,
it is assumed that her investment in and connection to her birth name
must be less significant.72 Yet early research found that, contrary to
researchers’ expectations, both women and men identified strongly
with their last names, and people tend to underestimate the number
of women who do so.73 Emens argues that the psychological connection
of men to their names stands to reason, given that boys are taught
from a young age that their names are permanent markers of their
identity, while girls are only taught of their names’ contingent im-
permanence.74 A girl grows up:
knowing from a young age that her name would disappear and
be replaced by another name, if and only if she were lucky enough
to be loved enough to be given a new name. Her children would
bear that name as yet unknown to her, that name that would
mark her success in love.75
Thus, to the extent that men are in fact more psychologically tied to
their surnames, it is a result of a social structure that tells them their
names are more important. This alone cannot stand as a justification
for continuing the very conditions which created it: namely, women
and only women changing their names at marriage. Indeed, “current
preferences are likely to be endogenous to the state’s previous man-
datory regime. It would be surprising if women’s (and men’s) prefer-
ences did not adapt to that mandatory regime.” 76 Yet courts have
based decisions on this presumed male psychological connection with
their names, ignoring in the process women’s interests in their own
names,77 and assuming that “women merely inhabit names which
actually belong to their husbands.” 78
71. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 5 (stating the author’s realization that men do “not have
the same sense of possibility about the transitory nature of names or identity in relation
to others”); Leissner, supra note 19, at 355 (describing the “discontinuous, temporary, [and]
adaptive” nature of women’s names) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
72. Doll, supra note 10, at 231.
73. Leissner, supra note 19, at 363.
74. Emens, supra note 55, at 778.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 764.
77. Cf. Leissner, supra note 19, at 363 & n.223 (noting findings that respondents
often “underestimate the number of women who identify with their birth names”) (citation
omitted).
78. Doll, supra note 10, at 235 (analyzing Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307, 309
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979), in which a mother’s attempt to change the child’s surname to hers was
actually an attempt to change the child’s name to that of his stepfather).
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Yet the issue involves more than simply a psychological connec-
tion to one’s surname. There appears to also be a psychological desire
on the part of a man not simply to keep his own name, but to actually
have his wife give up her name in favor of his. Indeed, studies have
found that men are less likely to view it as acceptable for a woman to
keep her birth name at marriage (fifty-seven percent of men versus
ninety-two percent of women).79 Men tend to assume that such an act
evinces a lack of love for the husband.80 Stannard argues that “a wife
by any other name than her husband’s is offensive to men,” 81 while
the wife who keeps her birth name after marriage is considered “one
of those women.” 82
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF LAW OF SURNAMES AT MARRIAGE
My name is the symbol of my identity which must
not be lost.
—Lucy Stone83
[A]n application to change the name of a wife with-
out the concurrence and consent of the husband
is . . . wrong in principle.
—Converse v. Converse84
The question of what the law actually requires when it comes
to names at marriage has been anything but clear. There is, and in
theory, has always existed, a common law right to change one’s name,
provided the purposes were not fraudulent.85 Nevertheless, possessing
a right formally and being able to exercise it practically are sometimes
incongruous matters, especially when it comes to women.86
79. Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 750; see also Rubiner, supra note 67, at L6
(stating that although most women think it acceptable for a woman to retain her name at
marriage, ninety percent of women still plan to take their husband’s name).
80. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
81. UNA STANNARD, MARRIED WOMEN V. HUSBAND’S NAMES, THE CASE FOR WIVES
WHO KEEP THEIR OWN NAME 3 (1973).
82. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1 (emphasis added).
83. Lucy Stone, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 81, at 5 (a statement that became the
motto of the Lucy Stone League formed by Ruth Hale in 1921).
84. Converse v. Converse, 30 S.C. Eq. 535, 539-40 (1856).
85. Linton v. First Nat. Bank, 10 F. 894, 897 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882); In re McUlta, 189
F. 250, 253 (M.D. Pa. 1911); Doll, supra note 10, at 228; Yury Kolesnikov, Chapter 567:
Saying “I Do” to Name Changes by Husbands and Domestic Partners, 39 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 429, 430 (2008).
86. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 163 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not grant women the right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139
(1872) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause does not grant
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Lucy Stone was the first known American woman to keep her
birth name after marriage, when she married Henry Blackwell in
1855.87 A prominent abolitionist and suffragist, Stone and her hus-
band jointly read a statement at their marriage announcing their
intention to enter “an equal and permanent partnership.” 88 Stone
was also the first woman denied the right to vote because of the use
of her maiden name.89 The Lucy Stone League was formed in her
honor in 1921 to litigate the right of women to use their birth names
after marriage,90 and the League was rejuvenated in 1997 to work
for equality in naming more generally.91
When women began more frequently to assert their right to
retain their birth name after marriage, the legal response was quite
negative. Although a woman’s ordinary use of her name could not be
controlled, the law was employed as a punishment mechanism in the
context of activities such as voting, driving, suing, and obtaining pass-
ports.92 The justifications used were rather sparse, typically referenc-
ing “long-established custom.” 93 Courts would also occasionally speak
of the social shame that would attend a relationship that gives the
appearance of illicit cohabitation, claiming that children of the mar-
riage would therefore suffer ostracism if such a thing were allowed.94
A New York court declared that:
women the right to practice a profession). The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantees were not applied to women by the U.S. Supreme Court until Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
87. Claudia Goldin & Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage
and Beyond, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 143 (2004); Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name
of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 253, 254-55 (1997).
88. Leissner, supra note 87, at 255 (quoting Julia C. Lamber, A Married Women’s
Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 794).
89. Leissner, supra note 19, at 353. Although this was before women gained the right
to vote with the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, Massachusetts had granted women
the right to vote in school committee elections in 1879. November 2, 1915: Voters Deny
Massachusetts Women the Vote, http://massmoments.org/moment.cfm?mid=316, (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2010).
90. Leissner, supra note 19, at 389.
91. Emens, supra note 55, at 768 n.7.
92. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (discussing
driving); Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) (discussing voting); UNA
STANNARD, MRS. MAN 256 (1973) (discussing passports).
93. Rago, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
94. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (citing lower court’s
findings of fact and law); see also In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (Ind. 1974) (Indiana
lower court denied a woman’s name change, where the state argued it would embarrass
future children and be an “insult to her husband.” The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the trial court’s ruling.); In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)
(denying a woman the right to use a different surname from her husband’s because of the
social shame arising from the appearance of cohabitation); In re Lawrence, 319 A.2d 793,
801 (Bergen County Ct. 1974), rev’d, 337 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (disallow-
ing a name change because of the detrimental effect on future children).
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[f]or several centuries, by the common law among all English
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her hus-
band’s surname. That becomes her legal name, and she ceases to
be known by her maiden name. By that name she must sue and be
sued . . . and execute all legal documents. Her maiden surname
is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby.95
Service of process on a married woman in her birth name was held
to be inherently invalid in Texas.96 The Supreme Court of Alabama
held in 1937 that the general custom was for a wife to be designated
by the surname and first name of her husband, together with the
prefix “Mrs.,” and that this identification of married women was
“more perfect and complete” than one which used their own first
name.97 An Illinois appeals court held that a woman could be denied
the right to vote when she did not re-register in her husband’s name
after marriage.98 The court noted the “long-established custom, policy
and rule of the common law among English-speaking peoples whereby
a woman’s name is changed by marriage and her husband’s surname
becomes as a matter of law her surname.” 99 In effect, that court de-
cided that the state’s “interest” in women adopting their husbands’
names outweighed the constitutional right to vote.100 A Hawaii statute
required women to adopt the name of their husbands, and they were
forbidden from thereafter changing their names.101 The statute was
not repealed until 1976.102 A Massachusetts woman injured in a car
accident had her lawsuit thrown out of court because her vehicle was
registered in her birth name rather than her married name, and it
was therefore illegally registered and deemed a “nuisance” on the
road.103 The U.S. Department of State concluded that a woman’s legal
name was that of her husband, routinely refusing to issue passports
to married women in their birth names.104 One woman was even sus-
pended from her job with the county health department for refusing
to adopt her husband’s surname after marriage.105 Another married
95. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat’l. Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881).
96. Freeman v. Hawkins, 14 S.W. 364, 365 (Tex. 1890).
97. Roberts v. Grayson, 173 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1937).
98. Rago, 63 N.E.2d at 646.
99. Id. at 645.
100. Kelly, supra note 18, at 25-26 (citing the holding in Rago, 63 N.E.2d 642, 646
(1945)).
101. An Act to Regulate Names, 1860 Haw. Sess. Laws 32.
102. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 4 n.8, 8 n.23 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1
(1993)).
103. Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 152 N.E. 35, 36 (Mass. 1926).
104. STANNARD, supra note 92, at 256.
105. Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 523 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding plaintiff’s gender
discrimination claim).
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woman applying for naturalization was denied the right to retain
her birth name on her naturalization documents, the court contended
that such refusal would result in minimal harm to her.106 Interest-
ingly, the “no harm, no foul” argument arises today in the debate as
to whether a man should have the right to adopt his wife’s name at
marriage,107 as will be discussed in Part V.
Even the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the issue
in 1972 in the Forbush v. Wallace case.108 An Alabama woman brought
a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of an unwritten
Alabama regulation that required the driver’s license of a married
woman to be issued in her husband’s last name.109 A three-judge
federal district court upheld the regulation, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision without opinion.110 Forbush was relied
upon in a 1976 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case upholding a similar
practice in Kentucky.111 These cases catalyzed the modern movement
for birth-name rights at marriage.112 As late as 1996, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in an immigration case refused to even refer to the
female petitioner by her birth name by which she identified herself.113
Instead, they insisted on using her husband’s last name, while at the
same time denying the validity of her marriage in the immigration
context, a move seen by the dissent as “cruelly ironic.”114
Thus, the custom of women adopting the surnames of their hus-
bands, while originally not required, became so ubiquitous that it
eventually developed legal force.115 Indeed, “[c]ommon practice has
always made common law.”116 Kelly discusses the “dynamic synergy”
between social custom and the common law and its relevance in the
marital surname context.117 Clearly the common law evolves slowly
in response to changing conditions, but in the case of marital names,
that process can be excruciatingly slow.
When the women’s rights movement was in full swing in the
1970s, women’s autonomy in name choice was one of many de-
mands.118 Some women began to see the retention of their birth
106. In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
107. Leissner, supra note 87, at 264.
108. Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
109. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 219 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
110. Forbush, 405 U.S. at 970.
111. Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583 (1976).
112. Leissner, supra note 87, at 258.
113. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Doll, supra note 10, at 233.
116. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 699 (Me. 1975) (citing Whelton v. Daly, 37 A.2d 1 (N.H.
1944)).
117. Kelly, supra note 18, at 24.
118. Leissner, supra note 87, at 257.
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names as a representation of their equal partnership in marriage.119
They considered the adoption of husbands’ names to be perpetuating
male dominance and maintaining the existing unequal social struc-
ture.120 It was believed that one of the reasons behind the social expec-
tation was to encourage the woman to take on the identity, achieve-
ments, and status of her husband rather than attempting to forge
and develop her own.121
The 1970s witnessed the gradual reversing of such restrictive
common law principles.122 With individual court decisions, Attorneys
General opinions, and state statutes, the law became well-established
by the early 1980s that a married woman had the right to use any
name she chose after marriage.123 The women’s movement, having
achieved what it was after, moved on to other issues.124 It is remark-
able, then, that 40 years later, “a maiden who slips on a wedding ring
will still, most probably, simultaneously slip out of her name,”125
while her husband will almost never slip into hers.
Feminist scholars of the 1970s women’s movement predicted
sweeping changes in gender norms with respect to names, including
the eradication of all name prefixes (Mrs., Miss, Ms., and Mr.) and
even the elimination of gender-specific first names.126 Yet these rad-
ical speculations make no mention whatsoever of the possibility (or
legality) of a man choosing to take his wife’s name at marriage.127
Apparently the abrogation of all gender in naming was more con-
ceivable than the idea of a man taking on a traditionally female role.128
With the difficult battles women fought to achieve the right to keep
their names upon marriage, there was no consideration of allowing
for the reverse; the battle was deemed won, and there has been little
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 257-58.
122. See Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussing that a woman
could be awarded back pay after being suspended from employment at a county health
department for refusing to adopt her husband’s surname after marriage); Davis v. Roos,
326 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a woman cannot be refused
a driver’s license in her birth name); Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975)
(holding that a wife was not required to take her husband’s name for voter registration
purposes).
123. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 28 (stating that a woman can use any name she would
like); Leissner, supra note 87, at 266 (recognizing a woman’s right to retain her maiden
name).
124. Leissner, supra note 87, at 266.
125. Id.
126. See EDWARD J. BANDER, CHANGE OF NAME AND LAW OF NAMES 54 (1973) (discussing
the elimination of gender-specific names and prefixes).
127. Nowhere in Bander’s discussion of a unisex name future is there any mention of
how men’s names will change. Id.
128. Id.
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investigation of the issue since then.129 However, not only have women
failed to win the social acceptance that would make that right a true
one, they have also not yet won the legal right to easily enjoy an
option that men have always had: to marry a spouse who adopts their
name. The question is, “Will she change?” or “Will she keep?” while
a prospective groom is never asked whether he will keep his name
when he marries.130 Of the studies on marital names that have been
undertaken, the husbands’ names are scarcely even mentioned, let
alone actually studied.131 It is clearly still an issue for women only;
men are not expected to participate in efforts towards equality in
naming. As Emens explains, “[s]he may be choosing, but so long as
his name is not up for discussion, she’s choosing from a very limited
decision set.”132 The change in the law is incomplete because social
views have remained the same. A woman’s (and her husband’s, cer-
tainly) choices are highly influenced by societal and family pressure,
as well as by what options are available to them legally.
A. Current State Laws
The Maine Supreme Court stated in 1975 of woman that, “[s]he
is on the same footing as her prospective husband in that she may
insist, as a premarital condition, that the family surname for her
intended husband and herself be that of her choice.”133 The court
was highly out of touch with social reality and the state of the law
in that sentiment, given that a woman did not have the social capital
to insist on her husband adopting her name, nor did a man have the
legal right to do so as a part of the marriage process.
Both men and women have the common law right to change their
names as they choose—at marriage or any other time—so the claim
that a man does not have the right to adopt his wife’s name at mar-
riage requires some explanation. When a woman marries, her change
of name is simple and straightforward. She may either fill in her new
name on the marriage license application, or bring the marriage cer-
tificate to the Social Security Office or Motor Vehicle Department,
obtain new documents, and her name change is complete.134 In most
129. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 9 (citing Leila Obier Schroeder, A Rose By Any
Other Name: Post-Marital Right to Use Maiden Name: 1934-1982, 70 SOC. & SOC. RES.
290, 290 (1986)).
130. Emens, supra note 55, at 775.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 777.
133. In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 701 (Me. 1975).
134. Name Change Options, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, THE CITY OF N.Y. MARRIAGE
BUREAU, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/name_change.shtml#procedure (last visited
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states this is not allowed for men; instead, a man who wishes to
change his name must go through an entirely separate and lengthy
court process for name change.135 A petition must be filed in court and
a filing fee paid (at least $319 in Cook County, Illinois).136 Normally
the person must also publish notice of the name change in a local
newspaper (with additional fees) continuously for a period of several
weeks, making quite personal information public, sometimes includ-
ing previous crimes and bankruptcies.137 The individual must then
appear before a judge and answer questions about the requested name
change.138 The process can be expensive, especially if a lawyer is re-
quired. What’s more, this statutory name change process is not always
guaranteed to be approved.139 Judges typically have discretion as to
whether to grant the change, the standard being what a court shall
deem “right and proper,” or for “substantial reason.”140 The petitioner
may also need evidence of “good character.”141 Under these standards,
a request may easily be denied for reasons that would not apply to a
woman changing her name at marriage.
In the exercise of their discretion, judges are free to apply what-
ever social norms (including personal gender role conceptions) they
find acceptable.142 One Florida man attempting to take his wife’s name
was told by a judge that getting married was not a good enough rea-
son for the change.143 In a number of cases, the right to change one’s
name was denied.144 Many cases have denied the right of a person to
adopt the last name of their same-sex partner, purportedly for rea-
sons of “public policy.”145 Though these cases were often overturned
Nov. 22, 2010); Five Filing Facts for Recently Married or Divorced Taxpayers, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. http:/www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105969,00.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., WHAT EVERY WOMAN SHOULD KNOW, 7, http://www
.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/10127.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
135. E.g., Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb.
10, 2000, at D2.
136. A Guide to Procedures in Change of Name Proceedings OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE,
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/county/change
_name.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
137. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 208.
138. E.g., In re Ross, 67 P.2d 94, 95 (Cal. 1937).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (“This provision permits the court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion to deny the application . . . .”); Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 189; Kolesnikov, supra
note 85, at 433.
141. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 11 (referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-4 (1999)).
142. Id. at 208.
143. Gonzales, supra note 135, at D2.
144. Cf. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 217-18 (noting that most marital name change stat-
utes are discriminatory, and that the Court should recognize the right to change one’s
name upon marriage as a “fundamental” right).
145. Emens, supra note 55, at 790.
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on appeal,146 they demonstrate the effect that judicial discretion—and
social norms—can have on the statutory “right” to change one’s name.
Furthermore, it is unknown how many cases were denied in which
the petitioner chose not to appeal. Clearly, any right that men have
to change their names through the statutory mechanism is not equi-
valent to the martial name change mechanism.
Currently only nine state statutes explicitly allow a man to
change his name through marriage with the same procedures as a
woman.147 Interestingly, it has been allowed in Maine since 1980 by
Attorney General opinion rather than statute.148 California was the
most recent to join that group in 2007, as a result of a lawsuit filed by
a man named Mike Buday, who desired to change his name to that of
his wife but was prohibited from doing so outside of the court pro-
cess.149 Rather than fight the lawsuit, California amended its law with
the Name Equality Act of 2007, which became effective in 2009.150 The
legislature noted the importance of names in Sec. 2 of the Act: “[T]he
choice to adopt or not adopt a new name upon marriage or registra-
tion of domestic partnership is a profoundly personal reflection of
one’s individuality, equality, family, community, and beliefs.”151
It should be noted that some states’ laws are not explicit, but
may be interpreted to apply to both women and men, and that male
name change at marriage may be allowed at the county level.152 This
results in what Emens identifies as “desk-clerk law,” where the law
essentially consists of whatever the person at the desk says it is.153
This results in interpretations that are incorrect and/or discourag-
ing of unconventional choices, with results being highly inconsistent
from one employee, and one county, to the next.154 In response to an
inquiry on a man’s name change, one clerk replied, “Society dictates
that the woman change her name. Now, you can decide to keep your
146. Id.
147. California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2009)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-33.1 (2010)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1 (West 2010)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 595.5 (West 2010)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 1D (West 2010));
New York (N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2010)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-03-20.1 (West 2010)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.220 (West 2010)). Louisiana’s
law provides that marriage does not change the legal name of either spouse, but spouses
may use each other’s names, and validly sign documents with either name or a combination
of the two. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (2009).
148. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-a, § 1401 (2009).
149. Martin Kasindorf, L.A. Man Sues to Take Wife’s Last Name USA TODAY, Jan. 11,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-11-man-sues-name-change_x.htm.
150. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2010).
151. Id.
152. Emens, supra note 55, at 819.
153. Id. at 765.
154. Id.
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maiden name or hyphenate your name or take his, whatever you
want. But men don’t normally change their names. I don’t know what
else to tell you.”155 Indeed, Mike Buday’s lawsuit challenged “how
state employees respond to a groom’s name-changing request with-
out a court order,” while the marriage license form itself varied from
county to county.156 Therefore, it is not exclusively state statutory law
that is in question; county and local practices may have as much ef-
fect (or more) on the name changing process as state law on the issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
Any woman is respectable who is commonly men-
tioned as Mr. Such-a-one’s wife, [but] Nothing can
make a man respectable who is commonly men-
tioned as Mrs. Such-a-one’s husband.
—Thomas Wentworth Higginson157
[W]e talk of you and Mrs. you.
—Henry James158
It should be acknowledged at the outset that there is much de-
bate within feminist theory about the legitimacy of marriage itself.159
155. Interview with Clerk in Jasper Cnty., Mo., (June 28, 2006) quoted in id. at 774.
156. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 432 n.28 (quoting Jim Sanders, Groom Alleges Bias
on Identity: Suit Says Man Was Blocked From Taking His Bride’s Last Name, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 7, 2007, at A3).
157. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 92, at 71 (noting
that Higginson’s article was published in Women’s Journal on September 27, 1873).
158. Letter from Henry James to William Dean Howells (Feb. 21, 1884), in HENRY
JAMES: A LIFE IN LETTERS 152, 154 (Philip Horne ed., 1999).
159. For examples of feminist critique of marriage, see JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE
OF MARRIAGE 13-14 (1972) (arguing that unhappy marriages are the result of societal
allocation of rewards and punishments on the basis of sex, because this practice creates
different marital experiences for the husband and wife); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE
DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 250-56 (1970) (arguing that
marriage promotes a “fundamentally oppressive biological condition,” and will continue to
be unsuccessful unless new alternatives are considered); MARILYN FRENCH, THE
WOMEN’S ROOM 35-37 (1977) (describing marriage and the convent as women’s only real
options, despite suffrage); GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 210-15, 234 (1971)
(arguing that the “marrying-and-living-happily-ever-after myth” has never and will
never be true); KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 208, 221-22 (1971) (describing how the
feminist view of women and the Sexual Revolution undermined traditional notions of
marriage); Sheila Jeffreys, The Need to Abolish Marriage, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 327,
327 (2004) (arguing for the general abolition of marriage). For examples of feminist
support of marriage, see ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, MARRIAGE: THE DREAM THAT
REFUSES TO DIE 44-45, 58-60 (2008) (arguing that marriage is intrinsically good, but that
notions of individual choices and rights has undermined the institution— turning it from
a special union to just a “lifestyle” choice); Mary Crawford, Marriage: The Telling & the
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Some contend that it is an inherently patriarchal institution that is
mired in sexist, heterosexist, religious, and exclusive rules and pre-
scriptions that are inextricable from the institution itself.160 It is
argued in various camps that marriage should be abandoned alto-
gether, modified, or replaced with civil union, or that it should at the
very least be supplemented with other equally acceptable forms of
relating.161 Yet that debate, while relevant, is not the focus of this dis-
cussion. The fact is that the vast majority of Americans will be mar-
ried within their lifetimes (over eighty percent by age forty),162 and
at this point at least, the institution is alive and well, despite the fact
that it is no longer the mandatory practice it once was economically
and socially. That being the case, the law regarding marriage should,
at a minimum, support gender equality on its face. Yet even this most
basic starting point has not been achieved.
The term “maiden name” itself likewise bears some brief discus-
sion. It is still the primary method of denoting “birth name” or “name
before marriage” for women, “maiden” meaning simply an unmarried
woman.163 After marriage, she is no longer a “maiden,” so her maiden
name is lost.164 Yet, despite the fact that the word “maiden” is no
longer used in common parlance to refer to an unmarried woman, we
have held on to the term when referring to names, which is further
evidence that our naming traditions have largely escaped critical
analysis. There is no male equivalent to the term “maiden name,”
other than perhaps the French ne (meaning born),165 which is unfa-
miliar to most Americans and rarely used in this country. Indeed, the
ubiquitous “maiden name” line on various forms has caused consid-
erable consternation in my own life, as I legally changed my surname
years before I married. Is my birth name then my “maiden name,”
even though it changed while I was still a “maiden?” The new name
also applied to me both as a “maiden” and a married woman, so do
Doing, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 313, 317 (2004) (arguing that the goals of feminism can
be fostered in committed relationships, like marriage, but that the emphasis should be on
the relational practices rather than the forms of the relationship); Vivienne Elizabeth,
To Marry, or Not to Marry, 13 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 426, 429 (2003) (introducing the
idea that marriage can have multiple meanings to different people and its mere existence
is not the issue).
160. GREER, supra note 159, at 187-94.
161. Id.
162. PAULA GOODWIN ET AL., WHO MARRIES AND WHEN? AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 5 (June 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db19.pdf.
163. Maiden Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.meriam-webster
.com/dictionary/maiden (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
164. Id.
165. Born Translation, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, http://translate.google.com/#en/fr/born
%0A (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
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I have two maiden names? There was lengthy and complicated dis-
cussion about this issue amongst myself, my husband, and multiple
hospital staff at the birth of my daughter, where confusion abounded
regarding the birth certificate forms regarding both my name and
my husband’s. Clearly the term—and all the documents employing
it—acknowledges only the standard naming structure, and thereby
continues to reinforce that structure.
There is a marked gap in feminist scholarship on the issue of
male name change at marriage. There has been some work that is
critical of our current naming customs and traditions with respect
to women.166 Very little research exists which addresses the issue of
a man choosing to adopt his wife’s name, as there is virtually no
acknowledgement even among feminists that the man even has a
choice to make. What little can be found focuses on the unconstitu-
tionality of the discrimination against men and the denial of their
equal protection rights.167 While this approach is clearly correct on
the surface, there is much more to the issue. What at first appears
to be discrimination against men is in reality discrimination against
women: the status quo represents a legal sanctioning of the social
norms that subsumed a woman within the husband’s identity. Be-
cause taking their husbands’ names at marriage was never really a
“right” of women, but rather a requirement, the “right” actually in-
heres in the man. In essence, women are still denied what men have
always enjoyed: the right to have a spouse adopt their name at mar-
riage. This is why, in a society that has almost never legally favored
the female over the male, and where men have always had the com-
mon law right to change their name whenever they chose, they are
nevertheless not permitted to do so at marriage.
Outside of the marriage context, compulsory name changing has
often been associated with cultural domination or assimilation.168
Nazis in the 1930s required Jews to add Sarah or Israel to their names
to mark them as “other.”169 Immigrants were regularly renamed at
Ellis Island in order to assimilate them into American culture, some-
times involuntarily.170 Slaves in America were often given no last
166. See, e.g., JUSTIN KAPLAN & ANNE BERNAYS, THE LANGUAGE OF NAMES 137-39
(1997) (taking a critical approach to the practice of women taking the husband’s name,
arguing that it leads to an inherently unequal marriage and the man’s consumption of
the woman’s identity); Leissner, supra note 19, at 364 (arguing that the technical and
bureaucratic obstacles that continue to accompany name change at marriage elicits a form
of “civil death” for women).
167. See, e.g., Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 188-89; Frandina, supra note 57, at 156-57.
168. Kelly, supra note 18, at 12.
169. Emens, supra note 55, at 770.
170. Kelly, supra note 18, at 16-17.
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names at all because, as property themselves, they could not have
an independent surname.171 When they did have last names, they
were named and renamed as they exchanged owners.172 This, in fact,
was when women first recognized that their own name changes from
father to husband seemed to signify a similar exchange of property.173
In the later words of one feminist scholar, “[l]ike a slave she was
brought to life by being given a name by her master . . . .”174 Although
this concept of surname as signifying ownership (of wife, children,
and property) is no longer overt, it is still undoubtedly present in our
social schema and naming framework.175
Courts litigating naming issues have talked of the “fundamental,”
“primary,” “natural,” and “time-honored” right of a father to the nam-
ing of his family,176 the presumption being that a practice so universal
must somehow be based in laws of nature.177 But aside from the fact
that the presumption of universality is factually inaccurate, it is also
logically fallacious; even a ubiquitous practice is not made just or right
by virtue of its ubiquity. Recent cases have discussed these male
rights in terms of the naming of men’s children, which has likewise
fallen under the patriarchal dictates of the male line, and against
which women continue to struggle.178 For example, an Oregon trial
court in 2006 granted an unmarried father’s demand to have his
child’s last name legally changed from the mother’s to his, for no
other reason than that he was the father.179 Court cases well into
the 1990s employed a tougher standard for mothers attempting to
change their child’s name after divorce than those who were never
married, suggesting that women still somehow give up naming rights
upon marriage.180 Leissner argues that despite some legal and social
changes, the right of naming still resides in the male.181 Under the
current naming scheme, women’s heritage is minimized. While a man
with no sons has his family line “die out,” no notice is taken of the
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Leissner, supra note 19, at 356.
174. Jeffreys, supra note 159, at 328.
175. See, e.g., Leissner, supra note 19, at 358 (arguing that a woman who gives up her
name has also given up no small part of her autonomy).
176. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr.
873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968) overruled by In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980).
177. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
178. Doll, supra note 10, at 227.
179. Doherty v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). The court overturned
the trial court decision, and granted the father’s request for name change of the child.
Id. at 466.
180. Doll, supra note 10, at 246.
181. Leissner, supra note 87, at 254.
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fact that the mother’s line dies out at the time of the marriage it-
self.182 There is no recognition that the mother is a part of the child’s
legacy—how often do women name their daughters after themselves
as men do?183 In fact, the current legal right of women to choose their
name after marriage is nothing more than an illusion, according to
Leissner, because of the remaining “strong legal preclusion from nam-
ing our children.”184 The denial of women’s right to name themselves
and their children are both elements of the same type of discrimina-
tion.185 Eliminating one means little without eliminating the other,
as most women do not want to be cut off from their families and chil-
dren, who will almost always be given the surname of the father.186
Allowing men to easily take the wife’s name would partially solve
this problem.
The same male “rights” logic was at one time applied to women
changing their names at marriage, though the principle is no longer
acknowledged outright, as it is now implicitly recognized that the
“natural right” argument may not be legally justifiable in that con-
text. Considering that well into the 1970s courts were still holding
that a woman must adopt her husband’s surname, the underlying
principle was strongly entrenched, and courts were eager to enforce
it.187 Presenting the issue as a requirement upon women rather than
a right of men makes it no less a male right in the eyes of the law.188
There has been little research into the actual last name choices
of both men and women.189 Studies are difficult to conduct because
data sets do not contain information on birth names and married sur-
names of women, much less of men.190 Some expectations and tradi-
tions are apparently so entrenched that we fail to even think to ask
questions about them. Most studies that have been conducted, how-
ever, find that seventy-five to ninety-five percent of all women still
182. Id. at 268.
183. Leissner, supra note 19, at 340 (“The fact that women cannot use indications, such
as II, III, Jr. or Sr., emphasizes the reality that ‘females are not regarded as part of a
dynasty.’ ”) (quoting Ralph Slovenko, Unisex and Cross-Sex Names, J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
249, 293 (Spring-Summer 1986)).
184. Leissner, supra note 87, at 254.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. There is even some evidence that courts considered this not just a right of indi-
vidual men, but of men collectively. In one case a trial court refused to allow a woman’s
name change even when the husband had consented, as if allowing it in one case would
taint the right of men in general. In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 358-60 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (overruling trial court’s rejection of name change request).
188. See Leissner, supra note 19, at 333-34 (discussing gendered naming power).
189. Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 724.
190. Goldin & Shim, supra note 87, at 143.
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assume their husband’s name upon marriage.191 The older and more
educated a woman is, the more likely she is to keep her own name,
but oftentimes highly educated professional women adopt their hus-
band’s name but incorporate their birth name as a middle name after
marriage—as did Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O’Connor.192
One 1994 study determined that ninety percent of women took their
husband’s name, and of the rest, only two percent used their birth
name exclusively with no change or name combination.193 There are
no studies about the numbers of men taking the names of their wives
at marriage—perhaps because the numbers are so small as to not
merit mention, or perhaps because it does not occur to researchers
to investigate such a phenomenon. The number, however, appears to
be increasing.194 Again we see the idea that she has a choice, but he
does not.
A. Women as Property and Social Expectations
Why is it then, decades after women ultimately won their legal
battle against conventional naming requirements, and at a time when
the legal identity of women is not formally absorbed by the husband’s
upon marriage, that the conventional choice is still preferred by the
vast majority of couples? History cannot be ignored or escaped when
investigating this question. The custom/requirement that a married
woman adopt her husband’s surname, quite simply, is rooted in patri-
archy. Historically, the wife was in fact the legal property of the hus-
band, so she took his name as a legal necessity.195 This is an element
of the system of coverture, whereby a woman’s identity is subsumed
into that of her husband.196 Jurist William Blackstone explained the
notion of coverture as it was understood in the eighteenth century:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
191. Id. at 144; Johnson & Scheuble, supra note 66, at 724; Christman, supra note
58, at F1; Hillary Drops her Maiden Name, BRISBANE TIMES, (Apr. 30, 2007, 9:37 AM),
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/world/hillary-drops-her-maiden-name/2007/04
/30/1177788007743.html; Rubiner, supra note 67, at L6.
192. Goldin & Shim, supra note 87, at 143.
193. Sue Shellenbarger, Odds and Ends, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1994, at B1.
194. Jessica McBride, More Grooms are Saying ‘I Do’ to Taking Bride’s Last Name—In
the Name of Love, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1999, at L1 (noting that the clerk
estimated the man took the woman’s name in one out of one-hundred couples in Milwaukee
County).
195. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
196. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *442.
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into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our
law—[F]rench a feme-covert, . . . and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.197
The wife was legally prohibited from, among other things, owning
property, entering into a contract, bringing or defending a lawsuit,
or keeping her own wages,198 as property can logically and legally do
none of these things. The practice of the wife assuming the hus-
band’s surname reinforced this legal and social absorption.199 “Cus-
tom said . . . that man owned what he paid for, and could put his
name on everything for which he provided money . . . . [H]is land, his
house, his wife and children, his slaves when he had them, and on
everything that was his.” 200 If the custom reinforced the underlying
inequality, does it not do the same today?201 Although such formal in-
equality has almost entirely disappeared from the law,202 it is still
present in our collective conscience; it would be virtually unthink-
able in law and policy for a man to want to be “owned” in that way by
his wife. Our language and naming continues to instantiate women
as objects, which is why it is so difficult to conceive of something so
objectively simple as a man taking his wife’s name: women do not,
and never have, owned men.203 This is presumably why the law still
does not allow for a man to take his wife’s name in most states.
Social pressure and expectations seem to play an important role
in the naming decision for couples, and they are bolstered and sup-
ported by the law. There appear to be strongly negative reactions to
nontraditional surname choices.204 Though it is presumed that we
have abandoned most traditional gender roles and norms, the simple
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. See, e.g., Mellot v. Sullivan Ford Sales, 236 A.2d 68, 70 (Me. 1967) (“In the eyes of
the common law upon marriage a husband and wife became one person and that person
was the husband. A married woman of any age was held incapable of entering into bind-
ing contractual relations and of acquiring or disposing of property. Upon marriage her
husband took over all her personal property and the use of her real estate for his life and
became responsible for her support, her debts and her torts”).
199. “Merger” was the term often used in the law, but it is misleading in that it implies
a combination of both identities into one whole, rather than the elimination of one in favor
of the other. If there is a “unity” of identity, it is situated in the husband.
200. Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW
& INEQ. 91, 138 (1985) (quoting Ruth Hale, But What About the Postman?, 54 THE
BOOKMAN 560, 561 (1922)).
201. See, e.g., SPENDER, supra note 15, at 25 (arguing that name change at marriage
reinforces the notion of women as property).
202. The law of marital names is a notable exception.
203. See SPENDER, supra note 15, at 26-27 (arguing that because women don’t “own”
men, there has been no need to make men’s marital status visible like women’s are).
204. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 9.
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fact is that much of American society has not. Sharply divergent and
gender-specific naming practices and expectations are both evidence
and results of that fact. It is rare for a man to actually take his wife’s
name at marriage. In fact, Emens calls the discouragement of naming
alternatives “the most robust feature of our current marital naming
conventions.” 205 Government agencies and forms are further evidence
and support for the status quo, when they ask the woman and only
the woman for her “maiden” name.
Aside from the psychological connection to names discussed
above, and the legal roadblocks that will be discussed below, there
also exists intense social pressure to follow prescribed norms.206
Women contemplating marriage hear comments such as, “I hope you
love your husband enough when you marry to take his name.” 207 It
would be unthinkable for a person to say the same thing to the man,
though presumably he loves his wife as well. As a result, a woman’s
choice to retain her name at marriage may, even today, be considered
“a political act,” rather than simply a choice based on personal or
family preferences.208
What is expected for women, then, is considered emasculating
for men. Men who consider adopting their wives’ names may have
concerns about how family and colleagues will react, and with good
reason; they have been called “gay,” “wimp,” “the feminine spouse,” 209
and not “real men,” 210 with references to drinking “sissy juice” and
“turn[ing] in your man card.” 211 One interviewee whose husband took
her name stated, “[w]e got tons of opposition from his mother. She
didn’t talk to us for a while. She got over it, but she threatened to not
come to the wedding. My parents were more supportive of it, but they
were like, ‘Can you do that?’ ‘Is that legal?’ ” 212 Outsiders believed
the wife was simply being controlling, forcing the husband into a de-
cision to which he was fundamentally opposed,213 because there is a
common belief that no “real man” would voluntarily give up his name.
California’s Name Equality Act of 2007 recognizes the strength of
such reactions and the damage they can cause by protecting both
parties in a marriage from “discrimination based on their name
choices” by those with whom they do business.214
205. Emens, supra note 55, at 764.
206. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
207. Augustine-Adams, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting a friend of the author).
208. Leissner, supra note 87, at 266-67 (citing Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 387 (1991)).
209. Emens, supra note 55, at 781 (citation omitted).
210. Christman, supra note 58, at F1.
211. Friess, supra note 3.
212. McBride, supra note 194, at L1.
213. Id.
214. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 436 (citation omitted).
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These social pressures and expectations naturally support the
laws that distinguish between the genders in naming. The law, of
course, often draws its principles from custom and practice, and jus-
tifies itself by reference thereto. Yet conversely, the law also works
to support or discourage certain social practices, and changing the law
is often the first step in altering societal perceptions and practice.
Indeed, “ ‘[t]he process by which law confers legitimacy on a struc-
ture of domination and dependency is primarily a system of symbols.
For a court to add the judiciary’s own special imprimatur of legiti-
macy on the symbolism of women’s dependency is particularly de-
structive.’ ” 215 It is not altogether surprising, then, that so few men
change their names at marriage, when they are not permitted to do
so in most states. The fact that policy and practice makes resisting
social trends more difficult speaks to our continuing patriarchal ten-
dencies. Our collective social attitudes about gender are accurately
reflected in the fact that most women still do not carry permanent
names of their own, but men do.216
While it is clear from the discussion above that names are cen-
tral to one’s self-concept and identity, they are also important in a
larger sense for what messages they send. Names taken at marriage
arguably define the relationship in some respects.217 If forcing a
woman to take her husband’s name potentially defines the marriage
as unequal,218 then preventing a man from taking his wife’s name
does the same thing. Naming choices send messages to children about
women’s status as inferior; children recognize at a young age that
their own family identity resides with their father, typically even
after a divorce.219 The message to children and to society in general
is that the male identity and perspective is the one that counts.220
There is even evidence that parents with biological children tend to
have a preference for boys, which may be related to the fact that only
boys carry on the family name.221 It is clear, then, that even if men and
women are both viewed as having a “choice” in their marital naming,
as they clearly do to some extent, the current framework formally and
informally preferences inegalitarian naming conventions.222
215. Leissner, supra note 19, at 331 (citing Kenneth Karst, A Discrimination So Trivial:
A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women’s Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 552
(1974) (alteration in original)).
216. See Leissner, supra note 87, at 254 (noting the lack of permanency might indicate
society’s belief that women’s roles are that of daughter, wife, or mother).
217. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 213.
218. Id.
219. Leissner, supra note 87, at 268.
220. Leissner, supra note 19, at 355.
221. Emens, supra note 55, at 784.
222. Id. at 764.
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V. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
[A] state’s decision to choose a rule that systemati-
cally harmed women . . . [is] the product of habit
or . . . invidious and indefensible stereotype, and
such decisions are inimical to the norm of impar-
tial governments.
—Rio v. Rio223
The United States has a long history of sex discrimination. The
Supreme Court has derided “stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes” and has held that state classifications based on sex are in-
herently suspect.224 At the same time, the law’s prescriptions and pro-
hibitions articulate certain conceptions of family, identity, and values
through the naming choices it makes available. Those choices are
currently limited based on gender. In the words of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the law’s rules derive from prevailing moral senti-
ment “ ‘avowed or unconscious, even [by] the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow men.’ ” 225 This is clearly the case with the
laws of marital names, which are based on moral sentiment, habit,
prejudice, and stereotype, and conflict with Supreme Court holdings
on equal protection of the laws.
The underlying basis of this particular legal disparity is not dis-
crimination against men. The fact is, however, that a disparate treat-
ment claim may be more likely to be upheld—and perhaps easier to
comprehend—when it is presented as discrimination against men,
so for practical purposes, that may be the best approach. This section
addresses the legal arguments that may be used to overcome the
gender disparity in the law.
While it is customary that a wife take her husband’s name, she
is permitted to keep her own. Thus, she is given a choice that in most
states the husband is not—he may only keep his name.226 The ques-
tion, then, is whether this gender disparity is constitutionally per-
missible. The law in question here constitutes gender discrimination
on its face. This does not in itself invalidate the practice; any such
provision is subject to intermediate level scrutiny, meaning that in
order to be upheld, the discrimination must be substantially related
223. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (App. Div. 1986).
224. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 688 (1973).
225. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in STANNARD, supra note 81, at 8 (alteration
in original).
226. See Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 441 (discussing some of the reasons why a man
may wish to adopt his wife’s name).
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to an important government interest.227 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that this standard applies whether it is women or men who
are disadvantaged under the law.228 Furthermore, courts have held
that naming choices implicate constitutional rights,229 particularly
when the law distinguishes between the naming rights of women
and men.230
It is therefore necessary to consider whether there is any gov-
ernment interest important enough to justify discriminatory marital
naming laws. The commonly cited interests include custom or tra-
dition, preserving the family unit, administrative convenience, fraud
prevention, and minimal injury (or de minimis injury),231 although
this last is not actually a government interest at all, but rather an
argument that the harm involved is so minimal as to not be worthy
of legal review.232 Yet none of these interests is likely to pass even
the lowest standard of constitutional review: the rational basis test.
Certainly none is an important government interest substantially
related to the marital naming policy such that it could pass interme-
diate scrutiny.233
A. Custom/Tradition
There is no dispute as to whether current state law on marital
names represents the standard custom; as discussed, it goes back
centuries. Yet that fact is meaningless in a constitutional analysis.
Custom is not in itself a justifiable reason for the maintenance of any
law, much less one that discriminates based on gender. Not only would
such a result be patently undemocratic, but the notion of “custom”
is also subject to interpretation and thus is easily manipulated.234
Indeed, “[t]o subject different groups to disparate treatment because
227. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding an Oklahoma statute allowing
females to purchase beer at a younger age than males unconstitutional, as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
228. See Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a statute making men alone criminally liable for statutory rape); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny to analyze a statute
with different standards of survivor benefits paid to women as those paid to men).
229. See, e.g., Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979) (noting the constitu-
tional rights involved in naming children).
230. See O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (discussing the equal
protection issue raised by a statute that allows a child to receive his/her father’s but not
his/her mother’s name).
231. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 437 (citing Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 200).
232. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 205.
233. See also Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 437-40 (discussing government interest in
marital naming).
234. Leissner, supra note 87, at 263.
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society historically has done so undermines the very purpose of equal
protection.” 235 Nor should the length of the custom make any differ-
ence in its justification.236 Equal protection jurisprudence is largely
a history of the courts overruling custom in favor of constitutional
rights.237 The court in Rio v. Rio rejected custom as a justification for
a required paternal surname for children, holding that such a pre-
sumption denies women’s equal protection rights.238 It is entirely un-
clear why tradition should ever be a guiding force in law simply for
its own sake. In fact, if tradition were held to be a legitimate state in-
terest when it comes to marital name practices, then the total subju-
gation of women should also be endorsed, as that was the custom for
the majority of United States history. In this sense, tradition often
amounts to bias and inequality, and neither is enough to legitimate
a discriminatory state law.
B. Preservation of the Family
Opponents of California’s Name Equality Act argued that the
state should not make it easier for men to take their wives’ last names
because doing so would weaken the traditional male role.239 They
argued that “[g]overnment needs to encourage men to be stronger
fathers who provide for and protect their families, . . . not to be sissy
men who abdicate their masculine leadership role because they’re
confused.” 240 Whereas it should be obvious at the outset that a man’s
surname has no bearing on how much he does or does not provide
for his family, the notion of “abdicating” one’s “masculine leadership
role” is important to the claim of family preservation.241 This view rep-
resents the idea that a family without a powerful “masculine leader”
is no family at all, and that a man without his birth name is by defi-
nition a failure in that regard.242 While such notions may underlie
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Marital
Women’s Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598, 598, 620 (1973)).
237. This took place with a number of once-traditional practices, including: segregation
(Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)); anti-miscegenation laws (Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1967)); reproductive rights (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 480, 485 (1965)); and gender discrimination (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209-10
(1976)).
238. Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963-64 (App. Div. 1986).
239. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 441 (citing Frank D. Russo, Why Did 26 of 32
California Assembly Republicans Vote Against the Name Equality Act?, CAL. PROGRESS
REP. (May 9, 2007), http://californiaprogressreport.com/2007/05/why_did_26_of_3.html).
240. Id. at 441 n.126 (alteration in original) (quoting Randy Thomasson, President of
the Campaign for Children and Families).
241. Id. at 441 & n.126.
242. Id. at 441, nn.121, 126.
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some of the opposition to equality in naming, it is fair to assume that
no state today would make such an argument in a court of law.
Yet because children born in a marriage historically took their
father’s name, while “illegitimate” children took the mother’s,243 courts
have held that allowing women to use their birth name after mar-
riage would contribute to the breakdown of the family unit,244 partly
due to the stigma of illegitimacy. Feminists at the time believed this
issue to be largely irrelevant, because once the traditional naming
practices became less common, the stigma would disappear.245 Grant-
ing for the sake of argument that family preservation is an important
state interest, there is no reasonable connection between that interest
and the law in question here. There is no reason to assume that pre-
venting men from adopting their wives’ names with ease would have
any negative effect on the preservation of the family. The stigma
discussed above is much less pronounced today, but if the husband
adopted the wife’s name, there would likely be very little of such
stigma on a day-to-day familial basis, as there would be no presumed
illegitimacy of children. Even so, the Supreme Court has indicated
that stigma is not enough to justify a discriminatory law in itself.246
What’s more, the argument is even less viable when one considers
that a man can adopt his wife’s name by going through the court pro-
cess. The issue is that he is prevented from doing so by the same sim-
ple process that his wife is able to use. The state’s purported interest
in preserving the family unit is even less cogent, then, because only
the straightforward version of the process is prohibited; the alterna-
tive court process, with the same end result, is still allowed. Family
preservation is apparently not a very serious state interest after all.
Furthermore, if it is true that a male name change implies a non-
traditional marital relationship, then that is likewise not a sufficient
reason to uphold the discrimination. The state has no interest in en-
couraging any particular type of marriage at all. One could marry
out of love, greed, practicality, loneliness, lust, familial pressure,
religious beliefs—the list goes on. Couples applying for a marriage
243. Leissner, supra note 87, at 264.
244. Id. at 264-65 (citing Julia C. Lamber, A Married Woman’s Surname: Is Custom
Law?, 1973 WASH U. L.Q. 779, 805 n.106).
245. Id. at 265 (citing Roslyn Goodman Daum, The Right of Married Women to Assert
Their Own Surnames, 8 J. L. REFORM 64, 99 (1974)).
246. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (rejecting the argument that stigma
and prejudice directed toward a child based on an interracial marriage of the child’s mother
is a sufficient reason to prefer one parent over the other in a custody determination). The
Court stated that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Id.
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license are not asked about any of these issues any more than they
are, or should be, asked about gender roles within the relationship.
If a couple decides that the woman will work outside the home and
be the “breadwinner” while the man raises the children, cleans the
house, and cooks, what does the state have to say about that? Nothing,
of course—nor should it. Yet it retains the right to dictate gender roles
when it comes to the names spouses adopt upon marriage. If the state
cannot prohibit husbands from being stay-at-home fathers, surely
they cannot prohibit them from changing their name at marriage with
the ease and simplicity that the woman enjoys. The state’s interest
is in regulating marriage’s entry and exit alone. It has no interest in
such personal matters as gender roles within the relationship.
C. Administrative Convenience
States have argued in the past that disparities in naming rights
are necessary because the alternative would be over-burdensome
administratively.247 This argument fails as well. In O’Brien v. Tilson,
the Court held that a state law prohibiting a child of married parents
from being given any name other than the father’s was not justified
based on undue administrative burden.248 Invalidating the law as un-
constitutional, the Court stated that allowing the right would not de-
tract from the registrar’s ability to perform its necessary duties.249
In Jech v. Burch, Hawaii law required a child’s surname to be only
that of its father, mother, or a hyphenation of the two.250 The parents
wanted to name the child with a non-hyphenated combination of
their two surnames; the state refused to allow this, claiming that it
would have to alter its record-keeping system and would thereby con-
stitute too much administrative inconvenience.251 The court rejected
the state’s argument, stating that “[f]or reasons which have still not
been explained satisfactorily to me, the department is completely de-
feated by the problem of indexing a child’s surname . . . .” 252 The court
ultimately concluded that denying this right amounted to a denial of
the constitutional rights of both the child and the parents.253
247. See O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (noting the state’s
argument that the naming system facilitated efficient and correct recording of births).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Haw. 1979).
251. Id. at 718.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 721; see also O’Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 496 (1981) (stating that a statute
requiring a child born in wedlock to bear his father’s name violated a constitutional right
to privacy).
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These holdings, although dealing with the right to name chil-
dren, would certainly apply to a state practice that allows a woman
to change her name at marriage but prohibits a man from doing so.
What the state already does for women would surely be only a minor
and quite temporary inconvenience to do for men, and would mean
nothing more than perhaps adding an extra line on a form and an
additional field in a computer system.
D. Fraud Prevention
The prevention of fraud has long been one of the only reasons
citizens were prevented from changing their names under the com-
mon law.254 The rule exists for the protection of creditors who rely
on the ability to correctly identify individuals to collect debts.255 Case
law confirms that this is indeed a legitimate government interest.256
Given that fact, the question remains whether the discriminatory
name change practice is substantially related to supporting that in-
terest. The answer is quite clear: there is no reason to believe that
treating one spouse differently than the other will have any effect
on identity fraud. If there is no appreciable fraud concern for women
who change their name at marriage, then there should not be any
fraud concern for men who do the same. States have implicitly con-
ceded by their current practices that name change at marriage does
not implicate fraud. For this argument to be viable, the state should
not allow either men or women to change their names at marriage.
In an interesting twist, the fraud prevention argument was previously
used as a justification for requiring women to change their names
at marriage,257 so it seems highly disingenuous to use the same argu-
ment to prevent men from doing so.
E. Minimal Injury
Sometimes states have argued, and courts have agreed, that the
harm resulting from state action is “de minimis,” or so trivial as
to not warrant court intervention or constitutional protection.258
254. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 430.
255. See Leissner, supra note 87, at 263 (discussing the potential for fraud inherent in
the marital name changing process) (citing Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 211).
256. See Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d, 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a child’s
surname could fraudulently designate paternity).
257. Leissner, supra note 87, at 263-64 (citing Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1945)).
258. Id. (discussing the characterization of the injury as de minimis by the court in
Forbush v. Wallace).
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Considering the importance of names to society and individuals alike,
this claim is clearly specious. The argument has been used in the con-
text of marital name change because even when they are prohibited
from adopting their spouse’s name immediately at marriage, men are
permitted to change their name through the court system by statute.
As discussed, that process is nowhere near equivalent; it imposes sig-
nificant extra expense, time, and burdens on men choosing a marital
name change that do not apply to women. The fact that there is a
separate process sends a message to individuals and society at large
about the value of that choice.259 Even if there were some separate
method men could employ that did not greatly increase their burden
in the process, that would nevertheless fail to justify the state’s re-
fusal to allow men to utilize the same procedure that is allowed for
women. The court in Jech v. Burch stated, “[w]hat is the state in-
terest in refusing to allow parents to give their child at birth a name
which they may immediately confer by way of change of name? I fail
to see any such interest.” 260
It may also be argued that the common law in nearly every state
affords anyone the right to change their name simply by calling oneself
by that name,261 a right which numerous cases have upheld.262 As
such, it is argued, any injury resulting from discriminatory state laws
of marital surnames is minimal because a person can change his name
under the common law in any case by simply calling himself by the
new name.263 Yet this common law right of name change cannot legiti-
mately be considered a true right any longer, given that legal docu-
mentation is required to effectuate the name change on bank accounts,
passports, driver’s licenses, social security cards, professional licenses,
etc. The common law right imposes no obligation on others to accept
the name change.264 A statutory name change is required to fully
achieve a change of name,265 and failing to allow it for men in the
way it is allowed for women poses more than a de minimis injury.
F. Right of Privacy
Given that “one’s own name is one of the most personal belong-
ings of any individual,” 266 discriminatory and restrictive name change
259. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 210.
260. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D. Haw. 1979).
261. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 206.
262. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S. Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 950 (N.Y. 1910) (discussing the com-
mon law rule that a man may change his name at will).
263. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 205.
264. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 431.
265. Rosensaft, supra note 48, at 212.
266. Leissner, supra note 87, at 262.
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laws implicate privacy rights, though this is not part of a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis. The right to adopt a spouse’s
name upon marriage is in fact central to the right of privacy.267 Sup-
porters of California’s Name Equality Act argued that the “ ‘people,
not the government, should decide basic issues like whose name to
take.’ ” 268 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that marriage
and family issues are private matters entitled to constitutional pro-
tection,269 stating:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.270
Whereas the issue in that case was procreative choice, the adoption
of a family name is likewise fundamental and personal, and is central
to the family relationship; there is no room for state compulsion here.
In O’Brien v. Tilson, the federal district court explicitly upheld the
privacy argument in the context of naming when it invalidated a
state law providing men more rights to the naming of children than
women.271 The court referenced the individual right to be free from
state interference in the making of private decisions, as well as the
right of individual expression.272
CONCLUSION
Whereas some state laws explicitly allow men to change their
names at marriage with the same ease as women, most do not. The
law’s imposition of outdated traditions not only fails to recognize the
changing needs and desires of individuals and families today, but it
267. Kolesnikov, supra note 85, at 442-43 (citing Press Release, Equality Cal., Bill Gives
Domestic Partners, Married Spouses Equal Opportunity to Take Surname of Choice,
(Feb 13, 2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/bill_gives_domestic
_partners,_married_spouses_equal_opportunity_to_take_surname_of_choice.shtml).
268. Id. (quoting Letter from James Vaughn, Dir., Log Cabin Republicans, to Assembly
Member Fiona Ma, Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 19, 2007)).
269. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords consti-
tutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
270. Id.
271. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
272. Id.
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clearly conflicts with constitutional rights and perpetuates tradi-
tional marital gender roles and archaic notions of women as prop-
erty. Whether it is considered discrimination against men, who do
not have the same ability to change their names as women, or dis-
crimination against women, who are denied the right to have their
spouse take their name and by social custom are still expected to give
up their own, it is clearly gender-based discrimination that evidences
no foundation in logic, fairness, common sense, or important govern-
mental needs.
It is time to critically examine this long-standing custom, and
the law that is based upon it, which have to date been largely taken
for granted. Our naming practices reinforce and reconstitute a legal
doctrine that no longer formally exists. In denying naming choices
based on gender, the law perpetuates, and implicitly supports, the
inferiority of women and the unimportance of their names and their
identities. The law has a responsibility to acknowledge the accept-
ability of egalitarian naming options. In doing so, it conveys a strong
social message that equality in naming is socially acceptable and
appropriate. Perhaps then this vestige of gender discrimination will
begin to disappear. Nearly forty years ago Una Stannard stated,
“whether common sense will prevail is not certain because emotion
not reason rules our legislators when they think about married
women’s names.” 273 The correctness of this sentiment and all that
it implies will be increasingly tested in the coming years.
273. STANNARD, supra note 81, at 17.
